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Abstract	
Energy is one of the sectors in which EU-Turkey cooperation could be most fruitful, possibly 
leading overall convergence through the common achievement of mutual interests in key 
areas - in particular, natural gas imports and diversification. Yet, this collaboration is undermined 
by the uncertainty over Turkey’s position vis-à-vis these policies and its undefined commitment to 
others, such as renewables and nuclear power; by doubts over the ability of the EU to balance 
security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness; and by the unclear growth trends of both 
regions. This situation is partially balanced by Turkey’s and the EU’s participation in 
several - sometimes successful - platforms for energy cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral 
levels (i.e. ENTSO-E, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and 
Med-TSO, the Association of the Mediterranean Transmission System Operators), which are 
aimed at the integration of the two polities’ energy markets. Nonetheless, the overall energy 
framework still needs a strong policy boost to set it on a common path towards convergence. 
 
 
Özet	
Enerji sektörü, AB-Türkiye işbirliğinin en verimli olabileceği, kilit alanlarda - özellikle doğal gaz 
ithalatı ve çeşitlendirilmesi hususlarında - ortak çıkarları yine ortak başarılara dönüştürerek 
muhtemelen en kapsamlı yakınlaşmayı sağlayabilecek unsurlardandır.Fakat Türkiye’nin enerji 
politikaları, yenilenebilir ve nükleer enerji konularındaki yükümlülüklerinin belirsizliği, AB’nin arz 
güvenliği, sürdürebilirlik ve rekabet meselelerinde dengeyi sağlayabileceğine dair şüpheler ve her 
iki bölgenin de belirsiz büyüme eğilimleri nedenleriyle bu işbirliği alanına tereddütle 
yaklaşılmaktadır.Bu durum kısmen hem Türkiye’nin hem de AB’nin çeşitli - ve kimi zaman 
başarılı - ikili ve çok taraflı, enerji piyasalarını yakınlaştırmayı amaçlayan, işbirliği platformlarına 
(bkz:. ENTSO-E, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and Med-
TSO, the Association of the Mediterranean Transmission System Operators) iştirak etmeleriyle 
dengelenmektedir. Bunlara rağmen, Türkiye ve AB'nin yakınlaşma sürecinde, ortak bir yol 
izlenilebilmesi açısından, enerji hususunda güçlü bir politikaya ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır 
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1. Introduction	
The mutual relevance of the EU and Turkish energy sectors is well known, and it has been 
reaffirmed at the institutional level on several occasions. These include the EU Energy Union 
strategy, as expressed in the 2015 February Communication establishing the initiative (European 
Commission, 2015b), and the last “Turkey-EU High Level Energy Dialogue” meeting of January 
2016 (Albayrak & Cañete, 2016). Indeed, Turkey’s geographical position makes the country a 
fundamental partner for European energy security, particularly in order to grant access to Caspian 
and Middle Eastern hydrocarbon resources. Conversely, Turkey can significantly benefit from the 
size of the EU gas market and its technological and regulatory advancement, especially in the field 
of renewable energy. Yet, despite this, the narratives proposed by the two sides often differ. The 
EU is indeed primarily interested in Turkey as an “energy bridge”, thus focusing on its role as a 
transit country.1 Turkey’s main narrative, on the contrary, encompasses a wider level of ambition 
for the country, which aspires to become a regional energy hub. Not by chance, the joint press 
statement of the 2016 High Level Energy Dialogue between European Commissioner Miguel Arias 
Cañete and the Turkish Minister of Energy, Berat Albayrak, summarizes the two positions, stating 
that “Both sides underlined the importance of Turkey as a key country for EU’s energy security 
and as a regional energy hub” (Albayrak & Cañete, 2016). Thus, despite different energy features, 
both the EU and Turkey have designed their energy strategies around the same three key 
objectives of competitiveness, security of supply and sustainable development. However, due to 
varying priorities regarding time and differing levels of ambition, energy cooperation between the 
two partners is still partial and the integration of their energy markets remains an incomplete 
process. 
On the one hand, energy demand in Europe has flattened out, as a result of both an economy that 
is still struggling to recover from the 2008/9 financial crisis and of ambitious decarbonization (and, 
particularly, efficiency) policies that are now producing their first outcomes. In the aftermath of 
the economic crisis, EU primary-energy consumption dropped dramatically from its 2006 peak, 
reaching levels not seen since the 1980s (Eurostat, 2016). In this context, the European 
Commission expects continental energy demand to decline steadily until 2040, at which time it 
will reach a plateau (European Commission, 2016e). 
On the other hand, in the past decade Turkey has been one of the fastest-growing economies in 
the world, displaying an economic dynamism that resulted in a 90% increase in electricity demand 
whilst gas consumption grew from 22 billion cubic metres (bcm) to 49 bcm. Despite the slowdown 
in economic performance that has been experienced over the last few years, access to secure, 
sufficient and affordable energy sources remains a key priority for the Turkish authorities. In fact, 
                                                        
1 Indeed, the Energy Union February 2015 Communication states that: “the EU will use all its foreign policy 
instruments to establish strategic energy partnerships with increasingly important producing and transit 
countries or regions such as Algeria and Turkey” (European Commission, 2015b: 6). 
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energy demand is, in any event, expected to expand to satisfy both economic activities and the 
increasing living standards of Turkish citizens. Security continues to occupy a prime place in 
Turkey’s energy-policy agenda as the country remains extremely dependent on external 
hydrocarbon supplies, with imports accounting for 91% of total oil demand and 99% of domestic 
gas consumption. 
This paper analyses the energy profiles, priorities and strategies of the EU and Turkey in order to 
evaluate whether or not in recent years the two partners have undertaken policy trajectories 
leading towards convergence. In conclusion, it explores energy relations between Brussels and 
Ankara, paying specific attention to both bilateral and multilateral institutional initiatives to 
strengthen cooperation in the energy and climate domain. 
2. The	 composition	 and	 future	 trends	 of	 European	 and	 Turkish	
energy	mixes	
A significant degree of uncertainty on both sides undermines the possibility of convergence 
between the European and the Turkish energy frameworks. Yet, similarities on core points of their 
energy requirements, in particular the need to diversify imports, as well as complementarities in 
others, such as a possible cooperation in the renewable energies sector, could rectify the situation. 
Indeed, while the EU is marked by a clearly declining consumption, Turkey’s is rapidly growing. 
The need for increased generation capacity could be largely addressed by Ankara through Russian-
managed nuclear power, with the risk of neglecting renewable energies, which the EU strongly 
supports. The uncertainty over the future of the Turkish nuclear programme could, however, push 
towards an increasing share of renewable energy sources (RES) - and thus convergence with EU 
interests. As the two lack domestic resources, and will continue to do so into the future, their 
shared need for the diversification of natural gas suppliers could be the key to draw them closer 
to each other. 
Thus, the answer probably lies in the resolution of key uncertainties for future EU and Turkish 
energy and economic trends. These comprise the issues of when and if the EU’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) completely recovers from the financial crisis, and whether Turkish GDP (with its 
associated energy demands) keeps growing and by how much; how Turkey will shape its 
generation mix, choosing between gas, nuclear, coal and renewables; and whether economic 
factors will prevail over political determinants in this process. 
2.1 The	EU	energy	framework	
The	present	and	past	composition	of	EU	energy	mixes	
The EU is the world’s third largest energy consumer behind China and the US (see Figure 1.1), and 
more than half (53.5%) of the EU-28’s gross inland energy consumption in 2014 came from 
imported sources. The Union’s consumption patterns show its dependence on fossil fuels. Indeed, 
until the early 1950s coal dominated, contributing almost 90% of the primary energy supply of the 
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six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). By 1967, coal accounted 
for only 35% of total primary-energy supply, and was replaced by oil in 1969 as the most important 
energy source. Today, despite the long-term downward trend since the 1990s, oil continues to be 
the most important energy source for the European economy, natural gas being the second. 
Although consumption of solid fuels (coal and lignite) has declined, consumption of coal has 
increased in recent years and only started declining again in 2014. 
The energy mix in the EU mainly involves five different sources. As of 2014, these were: petroleum 
products (including crude oil) (34%), natural gas (21%), solid fuels (lignite and hard coal) (17%), 
nuclear energy (14%) and renewable energies (13%)2 (see Figure 1.1). In 2015, these shares 
remained roughly at the same level, natural gas accounting for 22% while solid fuels decreased to 
16% (see Figure 1.1). Figure	2.1	-	World	Gross	Inland	Consumption	by	Region,	1995-2014	(Million	toe)	3	
 
Source: European Commission, 2016c: 12. 
Each EU member state has sovereignty over its own national energy mix, which leads to the fact 
that the shares of the different energy sources in the total energy available vary considerably 
between states. For example, in 2015 oil accounted for a significant share of the total energy 
available in Cyprus (93%), Malta (85%) and Luxembourg (63%), while natural gas made up around 
a third in the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom. Over half of the energy available in 
                                                        
2 All data, if not indicated otherwise, are based on European Commission, 2016c. 
3 The tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a conventional standardized unit for measuring energy. 
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Estonia (62%) and Poland (51%) came from solid fuels (mainly coal). In France and Sweden nuclear 
energy accounted for 45% and 32% respectively. Renewable energy made up over a third in Latvia 
(35%) and Sweden (42%). 
With regard to long-term trends of the overall EU-28 energy mix during the period 1990-2015, 
there was an overall gradual decline in the share of petroleum products. The combined share of 
petroleum products and solid fuels fell from 65.0% of total consumption in 1990 to 50.7% in 2010 
and 50.6% by 2015, reflecting a move away from the most polluting fossil fuels. The share of 
nuclear energy rose to a peak of 14.5% in 2002 but dropped back, before increasing somewhat to 
reach 13.6%. By contrast, the share of EU-28 gross inland consumption accounted for by 
renewable energy sources was 13% in 2015, three times its share (4.3%) of the energy mix in 1990. 
The share of natural gas also increased relatively quickly during the 1990s and more slowly 
thereafter, to peak at 25.4% in 2010. Its share fell during the next four years to reach 22% in 2015, 
partly due to the low coal price of recent years, which made it cheaper to generate electricity with 
coal than with gas (see Section 2.1.4).4 
Trends	in	energy	demand	and	their	relationship	with	GDP	and	other	factors	
The European Union is one of the largest economies in the world, with a GDP of about €14,632 
billion in 2015, and 508.4 million consumers, or 6.9% of the world’s population. The value of the 
energy sector in the EU (excluding energy-intensive industries) was around 2.5% of its total GDP. 
The gross inland energy consumption5 in the Union in 2015 was 1,626.4 Mtoe, slightly higher than 
in 2014 (1,604.6 Mtoe). It was relatively stable during the period 1990-2015, with a strong decline 
in 2009 as a result of the financial and economic crisis, falling by around 8% from its peak in 2005-6 
with 1,831 Mtoe. The crisis strongly impacted on industrial production and energy demand as well 
as investment. At the same time, many energy-efficiency policies started to have a visible impact 
on curbing the demand. Thus, after two decades of sustained growth in energy demand and 
supply, the slow economic recovery and energy-efficiency policies resulted in returning the EU 
bloc to its energy consumption levels of 1990 in 2012. 
 
                                                        
4 For the Section, see Eurostat, Statistics Explained: Consumtion of Energy, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Consumption_of_energy. 
5 Gross inland consumption describes the total energy demand of a country. 
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Figure 2.2 - Share of energy primary resources in EU total energy mix (% of total, based on Mtoe) 
 
Source: European Commission, 2016c: 22. 
Energy intensity can be considered as an approximation of the energy efficiency of a nation’s 
economy. It indicates how much energy is needed to produce a unit of GDP. A comparison of the 
historical trends in each country shows that, with the exception of Estonia and Greece, energy 
intensity decreased in all EU countries over the last decade. The reasons for this development are 
manifold: a faster growth in GDP than in energy demand and a general shift from an industrial 
towards a service-based economy can be observed. In addition, there has been a shift within 
industry to less energy-intensive production methods, including the closure of inefficient units. 
This follows a general trend, as shown by the International Energy Agency (IEA). In countries and 
blocs with a high GDP per capita, such as the US, Japan or the EU, the energy consumption per 
capita decreases, while for China, India and other emerging economies the opposite trend can be 
observed. The growth in GDP per capita, electrification and similar development programmes in 
the latter have led to an increase in the energy consumption per capit
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Figure 2.3 - - Energy intensity of the economy, 2004-2009-14 (in kilograms of oil equivalent - kgoe per €1,000 GDP) 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics Explained: Energy Trends, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_trends. 
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Energy-mix	dynamics:	production,	imports	and	vulnerability	
Europe has experienced a decline in the primary production of hard coal; lignite; crude oil; natural 
gas; and, more recently, nuclear energy. In 2014, nuclear energy (29.4% of total EU energy 
production) was the largest source contributing to energy production in the EU. Renewable energy 
(25.5%) - such as hydro, wind and solar energy - was the second largest source, followed by 19.4% 
solid fuels - mainly hard coal, natural gas (15.2%) and crude oil (9.1%) (see Figure 1.4). 
 
Figure 2.4 - The EU’s share of domestic production by source (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat website: Statistics Explain: Energy Production and Imports, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports. 
 
The highest level of primary-energy production among the EU member states was in France, with 
a 17.86% share (deriving mainly from nuclear energy, with 82.8% of total national energy 
production and as shown by Table 1.1), followed by Germany (15.65%) and the UK (15.45%). 
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Table 2.1 - Energy production by country, 2004 and 2014 (Mtoe) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat website: Statistics Explain: Energy Production and Imports, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports. 
The overall decline in EU domestic production has led to an increased reliance on primary-energy 
imports in order to satisfy demand. Moreover, as this trend will continue in the foreseeable future, 
gas imports are expected to increase between 2020 and 2030 while oil imports are projected to 
remain stable, even in a decarbonization scenario (IEA, 2014). 
Energy-import dependence is thus a fact of life for the EU. Since 2004, its net imports of energy 
have been greater than the Union’s primary production. The EU’s imports of primary energy 
exceeded exports by some 881 Mtoe in 2014. Relative to population size, the largest net importers 
in 2014 were Luxembourg, Malta and Belgium. The dependency on energy imports increased to 
around 40% of gross energy consumption in the 1990s, reaching 53.5% by 2014 (see Table 1.2). In 
2014, nearly 88% of the EU’s crude oil, 67% of its natural gas, 68% of its hard coal and 95% of the 
uranium needed for its nuclear fuel were imported. The lowest energy-dependency rates in 2014 
were recorded for Estonia, Denmark, Romania and Poland (dependency rates below 30.0%), while 
Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus were (almost) entirely reliant on primary-energy imports, with 
dependency rates of over 90%. 
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Table 2.2 - EU-28 Energy Import Dependency by Fuel (%) 
 
Source: European Commission, 2016c: 24. 
Russia has remained the EU’s main supplier of crude oil (30.4%) and natural gas (37.9%) over the 
years. Norway is the second largest supplier of EU imports of crude oil (13.1%) and natural gas 
(31.8%). Algeria delivers 11.9% of natural gas imports. With regard to crude oil imports, Russia 
and Norway were followed by Nigeria (9.1%) and Saudi Arabia (8.9%).6 Almost three quarters of 
solid fuel (mostly coal) imports came from Russia (29.0%), Colombia (21.2%) and the United States 
(20.5%). 
The security of the EU’s primary-energy supplies may be threatened if a high proportion of imports 
are concentrated among relatively few partners, and this is a specific concern in the gas sector. 
Despite investment made in liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, more than two thirds (69.1%) 
of the EU’s imports of natural gas in 2014 came from Russia or Norway - a share that in 2010 
accounted for 59.6% of total gas imports. Member states such as Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
the Baltic nations are the most vulnerable vis-à-vis this situation, since they are nearly 100% 
dependent on Russian pipeline gas. Even though the Union reformed its gas emergency policies 
in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis, several shortcomings remain. Reverse flows are not available 
at all interconnection points between market areas, and access across borders to storage and LNG 
is then hampered. As the recently published “Second Report on the State of the Energy Union” by 
the European Commission (2017) points out, through lack of pipelines vast areas of the EU remain 
physically disconnected from each other. 
In addition, a rapid decline in the bloc’s indigenous gas production, notably in the Netherlands and 
Denmark, can be observed. As a result of declining domestic production, from 2004 to 2014 the 
EU’s dependency on non-member countries for supplies of natural gas grew 13.8 percentage 
points faster than the growth in dependency for crude oil (7.5%) and solid fuels (7.4%). 
  
                                                        
6 Kazakhstan (6.4%), Iraq (4.6%), Azerbaijan (4.4%) and Algeria (4.2%) contributed with smaller amounts. 
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2.2 The	Turkish	energy	framework	
The	present	and	past	composition	of	Turkey’s	energy	mixes	
Fossil fuels dominate Turkey’s energy mix. Figure 1.5 allows us to compare the country’s annual 
energy mixes since 1999. The share of oil in the primary-energy supply7 has been decreasing 
steadily since 1999, when it reached a peak of 41.2%. The lowest share (26%) occurred in 2015. 
Oil represented the largest share of Turkey’s energy mix until 2007, when natural gas overtook it. 
In contrast to the decreasing share of oil, the value of natural gas in the country’s total primary-
energy supply has been increasing. From a 14.48% share in 1999, it grew steadily to the level of 
31% in 2015. Although coal’s share slightly decreased in 2001, it ranged between 23.98% (in 2005) 
and 28.90% (in 2011), which was its peak point. There was a decrease in the share of biofuels and 
biomass, whereas the share of hydro ranges between 2.6 and 4.77%. In addition, it is possible to 
witness a steady increase in wind and geothermal energy, although the overall share of renewable 
energy (including hydro) in total primary-energy supply is still relatively low, accounting for only 
12% in 2015 (General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2016). 
Figure 2.5 - Share of energy resources in Turkey’s total energy mix (%) 
 
Source: Data from General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables, various 
years. Compiled, calculated and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
 
                                                        
7 Primary energy supply refers to domestic energy production plus energy imports, minus energy exports, minus 
international bunkers, plus or minus stock changes, plus or minus statistical differences. 
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Figure 1.6 shows the changes in Turkey’s primary-energy supply for each energy source since 
1999, highlighting the contrast between fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. The decrease 
in biomass and biofuel is obvious. Oil stayed more stable compared with coal and natural gas, as 
the amount ranged between 29 and 36 Mtoe. In contrast, primary natural gas supply increased 
steadily since 1999, with only a slight decrease in 2009 as compared with 2007 and 2008. However, 
the increase continued until 2015, when there was again a slight decrease compared with 2014. 
Coal supply follows a similar path, despite a trough in 2001. From that year, a steady increase 
occurred until 2012, in which year the peak point was reached. After a decrease in 2013, the coal 
supply started to increase again and slightly decreased in 2015. While the share of coal in primary-
energy supply was 26.24% in 2015, it is expected to reach 37% in 2023 (Ministry of Energy of the 
Republic of Turkey, 2016a: 13). By exploiting significant amounts of domestic lignite and hard-coal 
reserves, Turkey expects to increase the electricity produced from domestic coal from 33,500 
gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2015 to 60,000 GWh in 2019 (Ministry of Energy of the Republic of 
Turkey, 2015: 35). 
 
Figure 2.6 - Primary Energy Supply in Turkey (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Data from General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables, various 
years. Compiled and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
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Trends	in	energy	demand	and	their	relationship	with	GDP	and	other	factors	
As Figure 1.7 shows, Turkey’s primary-energy supply and its population have both been steadily 
increasing. There are slight decreases in the primary-energy supply in 2001, 2008 and 2009, which 
could be related to the economic crisis. However, there is not to a direct relationship between 
primary-energy supply and population trends during these years. Despite a drop in Turkey’s 
energy supply in 2001, the steady growth in population continued. Thus, drivers other than 
population (such as GDP) clearly influence primary-energy supply. 
 
Figure 2.7 - Primary-energy supply and population in Turkey 
 
Source: Data from the General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables, 
various years; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017b. Compiled and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
 
By contrast, there is a direct relationship between primary-energy supply and GDP. As Figure 1.8 
shows, the two follow almost the same path. Both of them show drops in 2001 and 2009, and 
both increased steadily afterwards. There are two exceptions to this similar trajectory, in 2008 
and 2013, though they are insignificant. Whereas there was a minor decrease in the primary 
energy supply in 2008, compared to 2007, there was an insignificant increase in GDP in the same 
year. Furthermore, there was a slight increase in primary-energy supply in 2013 while a drop 
occurred in GDP. 
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Figure 2.8 - Primary-energy supply and GDP in Turkey 
 
Source: Data from General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables; Turkish 
Ministry of Development, 2015: 9. (Converted to €, 1€ = Turkish lira - TRY 3.6862). Compiled and graphed by 
Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
The	dynamics	of	energy	mixes:	production,	imports	and	vulnerability	
Being unable to meet its energy demand by means of indigenous production, Turkey has a high 
external dependency. Its share of import dependency was 75% in 2014 (Turkish Petroleum, 2016: 
26). This outcome is mainly due to the dominance of oil, natural gas and imported coal in Turkey’s 
primary-energy supply. However, it is also important to stress that demand growth is higher than 
the speed of resource development in Turkey. Indeed, the country has indigenous coal reserves 
and a large potential for renewable energy sources, a fact that will be elaborated upon in further 
subsections. Turkey’s potential for the development of unconventional energy resources is a 
controversial topic due to uncertainties about reserves, the cost of drilling and environmental 
concerns (Gürbüz, 2015). 
As shown by Figure 1.9, the share of domestic production in total primary-energy supply dropped 
from almost 38% in 1999 to 24% in 2015. In contrast, the share of energy imports increased from 
66% in 1999 to 87% in 2015, which was the peak point, despite slight decreases in 2008, 2009, 
2011 and 2013 (General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, various years). 
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Figure 2.9 - Domestic production and imports in total primary-energy supply (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Data from the General Directorate of Energy Affairs of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables, various years. 
Compiled, calculated and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
Figure 1.10 shows import dependency for each energy resource. The share of imported coal in the 
total coal supply has risen from 31.55% in 1999 to 54.07% in 2014. Despite the lowest point in 
2001 and slight decreases during 2008-11, there has been a steady increase in the amount of 
imported coal. The share of imports in total natural gas supply is, by contrast, constant and it 
covers almost all Turkish gas consumption. The share of asphaltite, petroleum coke and coke, 
classed as “other” in the figure, was also high, ranging between 81 and 105%8 (General Directorate 
of Energy Affairs of Turkey, various years). 
 
                                                        
8 Figures more than 100% show re-exports, stock change and international bunkers. 
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Figure 2.10 - Turkey’s share of imports by source (%) 
 
Source: Data from the General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables, 
various years. Compiled, calculated and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
Figure 1.12 explains why import dependency is high in Turkey. The steady increase in imported 
coal shown in Figure 1.10 is due to a decrease in domestic production, as shown in the intervening 
Figure 1.11. The peak point in the domestic share of coal production was in 2001 with a proportion 
of 67%, and the lowest point was in 2014 with 45% (General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the 
Republic of Turkey, 2016). This decline was compensated for by imported coal. As of September 
2016, lignite reserves amount to 12,716 million tonnes, of which 0.15% was produced in 2016. 
The figure for hard coal was 1,299 million tonnes, of which 0.05% was produced as of September 
2016 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Turkey, 2016b: 48). The 
framework is worse for natural gas, as domestic-production share accounted to 5.6% of total 
natural gas consumption in 1999, decreasing to 1% in 2014 (General Directorate of Energy Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, 2016). Turkey’s estimated natural gas reserves are completely 
inadequate to meet the country’s current demand. Indeed, as of August 2015, natural gas reserves 
amounted to approximately 19 bcm (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of 
Turkey, n.d.) whereas consumption in 2015 was 48 bcm (EMRA, 2016b). The share of oil 
production in total oil supply has been quite steady, though the peak point was reached in 1999 
with 10%. The only increase compared to 1999 has been in the domestic production of asphaltite, 
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coke and petroleum coke in 2009 and 2010, which account for a still limited 19% of total 
consumption (General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, various years). 
Figure 2.11 - Turkey’s share of domestic production by source (%) 
 
Source: Data from the General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables, 
various years. Compiled, calculated and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
The striking point regarding coal is the fact that domestic production exceeded coal imports during 
1999-2003 and 2007-11 (Figure 1.12). Starting from 2012, coal imports have surpassed domestic 
coal. As for natural gas, Figure 1.12 demonstrates that despite a slight decrease in 2009 there has 
been a steady growth in natural gas imports. Bearing in mind that Turkey imports almost all of its 
natural gas, as is shown in Figure 1.10, Figure 1.12 shows that the country’s import dependency 
in natural gas has been constantly increasing. Similarly, there is a large gap between domestic oil 
production and oil imports. 
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Figure 2.12 - Turkey’s domestic production and imports (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Data from the General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables, 
various years. Compiled and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
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3. The	EU	and	Turkey:	mid-	and	long-term	strategies	
Common points between EU and Turkish energy strategies are limited, and convergence can be 
achieved only if key problems are solved. Indeed, despite natural gas being the most important 
sector in energy cooperation between the two, it is hampered by a lack of determination in the 
liberalization process on the Turkish side, and by a still unclear balance between EU policies on 
fossil fuels and its environmental commitments. In addition, the two polities are clearly diverging 
on climate policies, as the EU is likely to retain its global climate leadership while Turkey’s 
involvement in the 2016 Paris Agreement is still significantly limited. Furthermore, even if the 
electricity sector presents an opportunity for positive cooperation between the two sides, unclear 
Turkish policies determining the future of its energy mix, mostly on nuclear and renewables, 
impact on the possibility of reaching a sustained cooperation with the EU in building generation 
capacity. This lack of clarity might be due, for instance, to the dominant role of Russia if Turkey 
were to develop nuclear energy to its declared level of ambition. The EU itself is not immune to 
uncertainty, as its climate commitments clash not only with natural gas-related ambitions but also 
with the still cumbersome presence of coal generation, hampering the reliability of its policies. 
Determining factors for convergence might be the success of the EU Energy Union, which would 
strengthen the overall solidity and the external dimension of the EU’s energy policy, and a clear 
turn by Turkey towards a more sustainability-focused energy mix and a liberalised energy market. 
3.1 The	EU’s	mid-	and	long-term	strategies	
Since the 1990s, the EU has been actively promoting the integration of climate and energy policies 
in order to tackle environmental and energy-security challenges. The “triangle” of EU energy and 
climate policy goals - namely (1) energy security, (2) affordability and competitiveness, and (3) 
emission reduction - describes the guiding framework for the Union’s long-term strategies and 
actions. Methods to achieve these three objectives include: building a European infrastructure of 
interconnectors and diversifying energy supply; enhancing competitiveness through a functioning 
internal market; and reducing CO2 emissions and increasing energy efficiency. The “Energy 
Security Strategy” summarized its goals thus: “In the long term, the Union’s energy security is 
inseparable from and significantly fostered by its need to move to a competitive, low-carbon 
economy which reduces the use of imported fossil fuels” (European Commission, 2014a: 3). 
However, keeping the triangle of energy and climate policy in balance has proved to be difficult. 
In 2008-9, when the policy goals for 2020 were set, the emphasis was on emission reduction. 
However, with the increasing costs of renewables subsidies and worries about high energy costs, 
the issue of competitiveness came to dominate the debate (Buchan, 2014). Finally, the 
Russia-Ukraine crises in 2006, 2009 and 2014, and an increasing energy-dependency trend (see 
section 1.1.3), brought the issue of security of supply back to the top of the agenda, as roughly 
15% of EU gas imports arrive through Ukraine. 
In February 2015, partly in response to the Russian threat to EU gas supplies, the European 
Commission published a communication on the Energy Union Package entitled “A Framework 
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Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy” (European 
Commission, 2015b), in order to promote a more collaborative approach to European energy and 
climate policy and thereby to coordinate the transformation of European energy supply. The 
Energy Union’s approach is based on the three aforementioned, long-established objectives: 
security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. In order to achieve these goals, five 
mutually reinforcing and closely interrelated dimensions were set out: energy security, the 
integrated internal energy market, energy efficiency, climate action, and research and 
development. Since its launch two years ago, views and national interests regarding the Energy 
Union’s goal have often diverged. While some member states - particularly in the east of the EU, 
where countries are almost fully dependent on Russian gas supplies - emphasize its energy-
security dimension, others highlight the energy transition towards a low-carbon economy. This is 
hardly surprising, as the EU has always been split over long-standing questions such as those about 
its huge dependence on external suppliers for natural gas, and the role of nuclear power. These 
debates manifest themselves in national energy mixes, which sometimes lead to contradictory 
results. For instance, when Germany decided to phase out nuclear power it experienced a rise in 
coal consumption and in its dependence on Russian gas supplies. As a consequence, Germany has 
been struggling to keep its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in check (Appunn, 2017).9 
Nevertheless, the Commission has started to translate its vision into initiatives - both legislative 
and non-legislative. The February 2016 “Security of Supply Regulation” (European Commission 
2016f) proposed a shift from a national approach in guaranteeing security of supply to a more 
regional approach by introducing a solidarity principle, according to which, as a last resort, 
neighbouring countries would help to ensure gas supplies in severe crises. Following this, on 30 
November 2016, the Commission proposed a new legislative package entitled “Clean Energy for 
All Europeans” (European Commission 2016a), the so-called second “winter package”, which is 
now up for negotiation. This proposal goes well beyond the previous three energy legislative 
packages by amending and extending to 2030 legislation on energy efficiency and renewable 
energy. The package deals mainly with electricity, tackling the design of the electricity market and 
proposing new governance rules for the Energy Union. 
  
                                                        
9 Germany had achieved a reduction of 27.2% in 2015, which needs to be confronted to its national GHG 
reduction target of 40% by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels). Latest projections even estimated that energy-
related CO2 emissions rose in 2016 by 0.9% compared to 2015 (AG Energiebilanzen, 2016). 
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Energy-market	liberalization	processes	in	the	EU	
In order to achieve competitiveness through a functioning internal market, the liberalization of 
electricity and gas markets has constituted “a core element of the EU’s agenda” (Schubert et al., 
2016: 149), and consists of three legislative packages (known as Energy Packages). 
As early as 1988, the European Commission suggested concrete measures to liberalize electricity 
and natural gas markets. In February 1997 and August 1998, two directives came into force that 
laid the groundwork for a gradual liberalization of both sectors: Directive 96/92/EC on electricity 
and Directive 98/30/EC on natural gas, respectively. This legislation focused on grid inter-
operability, unbundling and transparency of accounting, third-party access and the establishment 
of an independent conciliation board. It was replaced by a second legislative package in 2003, 
which set common rules for internal markets in electricity and natural gas (Directive 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC). This enabled new gas and electricity suppliers to enter member states’ markets, 
and consumers to choose their own suppliers. In April 2009, a third legislative package, aiming at 
further liberalizing the internal electricity (2009/72/EC) and natural gas (2009/73/EC) markets, 
was adopted by amending the second package. It intended to: 
• regulate transmission-network ownership by ensuring a clear separation of supply and 
production activities from network operation; 
• ensure more effective regulatory oversight by independent national energy regulators; 
• reinforce consumer protection and ensure the safeguarding of vulnerable consumers; 
• regulate third-party access to gas storage and LNG facilities, and lay down rules concerning 
transparency and regular reporting about gas reserves; 
• promote regional solidarity by requiring member states to cooperate in the event of severe 
disruptions of gas supply, by coordinating national emergency measures and developing gas 
interconnections. 
There is still a long way to go to achieve a fully integrated market. Domestic-market characteristics 
and prices vary between states. For instance, in the electricity sector the EU operates 28 grids 
instead of one Union-wide grid linking suppliers and consumers. In contrast to what was expected 
by the European Commission, electricity prices have increased over the last 20 years. With a view 
to the gas market, the Ukraine-Russia crisis especially drew public and political attention to the 
urgent need for modernizing and investing in cross-border infrastructure. 
Decarbonization	policies	and	the	path	after	the	Paris	Agreement	
Parallel to its approach on competitiveness, the European Commission uses environmental 
legislation to drive its energy policy. Since adopting the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the late 1990s, the EU has struggled to achieve emission-reduction 
goals whilst maintaining industrial growth. Today, the European Union perceives itself as a leader 
on international climate policy. According to the Directorate-General for Climate Action, the EU 
has been a driving force in international negotiations on climate change, which contributed 
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significantly to the new global climate agreement. In this context, at the 2015 Climate Change 
Conference in Paris, Europe committed itself to contributing to limiting the global rise in 
temperature to only 1.5 degrees Celsius. To achieve its decarbonization objectives, the EU has 
formulated legally binding targets for 2020 and 2030 and supplementary goals for 2050 - designed, 
however, on the basis of a 2-degree reduction target. 
Following its downward trend, Europe accounted for 3,607 million metric tonnes of carbon 
dioxide, representing a 10.8% share of the world’s emissions in 2013, which totalled 33,398 million 
tonnes of CO2 (including CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and international maritime and 
aviation bunker fuels). For comparison, the US totalled 5,234 million metric tonnes (15.7%) while 
China produced 9,114 million metric tonnes (27.4%) (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure 3.1 - World CO2 Emissions by Region, 1995-2013 (in million metric tonne CO2) 
 
Source: European Commission, 2016c: 18. 
 
The “Trends and projections in Europe 2016” report (EEA, 2016) reveals that GHG emissions in 
Europe decreased by 23% between 1990 and 2014, and reached the lowest levels on record. The 
report projects that, on current trends, EU emissions cuts will slow to 24% in 2020 and 27% in 
2030. 
Despite extensive EU regulations and proclamations, Europe’s carbon emissions actually increased 
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in 2014-15. In 2015, GHG emissions in the European Union were 22% below their 1990 level. The 
official report by the European Commission (2017: 4) tends to treat this as a slight backward trend 
in 2015, by looking at the overall emissions decline since the 1990s. But if one removes the impact 
of the decline of industrial and power sectors in Eastern Europe following the fall of the 
Communist regimes (so-called “wall-fall profits”), which meant automatic CO2 reductions, it is 
questionable whether the EU’s renewable energy and climate policy has been effective in cutting 
GHG emissions. 
The actual impact of EU targets, such as the reduction goal of at least 20% in GHG emissions 
compared with 1990 levels by 2020 (see below), remains open for debate. The European 
Environment Agency (EEA) attributes the overall emissions drop to a combination of 
factors - economic cycles, the downsizing of the global economy, climate policies, measures to 
tackle fluorinated gases, and mild winters that have reduced demand for energy and heat. These 
findings have led the European Parliament to debate the utility of the EU Emissions Trading System 
(EU-ETS), which has attempted to use market mechanisms to lower carbon emissions. 
Set up in 2005, with the objective of supporting the Union’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, 
the EU Emission Trading Scheme is the EU’s key tool for reducing GHG emissions cost-effectively. 
It remains the largest multi-sector example of emissions trading in operation today, encompassing 
more than 11,000 installations (power stations and industrial plants) across 31 countries10 and 
covering approximately 45% of total EU GHG emissions. The system works by putting a limit on 
overall emissions from covered installations, which is then reduced each year. Within this limit, 
companies can buy and sell emission allowances as needed.11 While this “cap-and-trade” 
approach was inaugurated as an innovative tool that gives companies the flexibility they need to 
cut their emissions in the most cost-effective way, it faced serious obstacles - the most important 
of which was a lack of harmonized standards across the member states. This led to miscalculations, 
price volatility and a market collapse (Schubert et al., 2016: 192). Over-allocation of allowances 
led to inevitable price crashes and large windfall profits from generous free allocation. Because 
annual allocations were determined before the economic crisis, which reduced emissions more 
than anticipated, this, together with high imports of international credits, resulted in a large 
surplus of allowances. This situation has led to lower carbon prices, and thus weakened incentives 
to reduce emissions. The Commission is optimistic that from January 2019 onwards, a market-
stability reserve will improve the system’s resilience to major shocks by adjusting the supply of 
allowances to be auctioned. Still, the real impact of the ETS in reducing GHG emissions is subject 
to debate. For example, only a few of the EU’s member states are on course to meet their own 
national targets (Schubert et al., 2016: 21). 
 
                                                        
10 All 28 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
11 For a detailed overview, see European Commission (2016b). 
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The	integration	and	development	of	renewables	in	the	EU	
One of the first EU initiatives in the renewables domain was the 1997 White Paper (European 
Commission, 1997), by which Brussels set itself a non-binding target of generating 12% of gross 
inland energy consumption from renewable sources by 2010. By doing so, the Commission laid 
the basis for a cause-effect policy model that led to multiple rounds of increasing renewable 
targets. The current policy agenda is driven by the integrated “2020 climate and energy package”, 
enacted in legislation in 2009,12 which sets out binding legislation to achieve the following “20-20-
20” targets by 2020 (see also Figure 2.2): 
• a reduction of at least 20% in GHG emissions compared with 1990 levels; 
• an increase to 20% of the share of renewable energies in energy consumption, and the share 
of biofuels in transport to a binding minimum target of 10%; 
• an improvement of 20% in energy efficiency. 
The Directive has changed the legal framework for promoting renewable electricity. It sets two 
mandatory goals: renewable energy should supply 20% of the EU’s gross final consumption by 
2020, and each member state is required to significantly increase renewables in its energy mix. 
Figure 3.2 - EU progress towards 2020 climate and energy targets 
 
Source: EEA, 2016: 9. 
 
                                                        
12 Directive 2009/29/EC, Directive 2009/28/EC, Directive 2009/31/EC and Decision No. 406/2009/EC of the 
Parliament and the Council. 
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Therefore, the EU member states have committed themselves to adopting national action plans 
indicating the measures intended to realize these goals. The national targets will enable the EU as 
a whole to reach its 20% renewable-energy target for 2020. In 2014, the share of renewables stood 
at 16%. 
Even though the majority of member states are expected to meet or exceed their 2020 renewable-
energy targets13 (see Figure 2.3), most of the emission savings up to 2020 will not come from an 
increased use of renewables, given the current state of technology, the efficiency of conversion 
processes and the limited availability of reliable renewable options. As long as member states 
retain sovereignty over their energy mixes, it is usually the market that drives decisions over 
national energy mixes. 
Figure 3.3 - Share of renewables in gross final energy consumption, 2014 and 2020 (%) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics Explained: Renewable Energy Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics. 
                                                        
13 According to the Commission’s (2015c) Renewable Energy Progress Report 2015, France, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands and the UK probably will not meet their renewable energy objectives. Achievement of the 
2020 renewable energy targets is also not certain in the case of Belgium, Spain, Hungary and Poland: it is only 
under optimistic assumptions related to the future development of energy demand and country-specific 
financing conditions that the 2020 renewable energy targets appear achievable. 
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Among renewable energies, the most important source was solid biofuels and renewable waste, 
with 63.1% of primary renewables production, followed by hydropower (16.5%) and wind energy 
(11.1%). Even though their shares are relatively small, both solar (6.1%) and geothermal energy 
(3.2%) experienced a rapid expansion. However, wind and solar power face challenges that have 
made their deployment slower than initially expected. Hence, despite progress in some areas, the 
overall trends in the renewable sector must be assessed cautiously because of economic crises, 
administrative and infrastructural barriers, policy shifts and the huge scale of investment needed 
(Schubert et al., 2016: 178). 
Already in 2011, different long-term scenarios were described in the Commission’s (2011) 
communication Energy Roadmap 2050. In order to achieve a transition to a low-carbon economy 
by 2050, the Commission suggested that, without further intervention, growth in renewable 
energy might fall after 2020 due to higher costs and other barriers facing renewable energies as 
compared with fossil fuels. “To achieve our longer-term goals for 2030 and 2050, a fundamental 
change is needed in the way we produce and use energy in Europe”, said the EEA’s director, Hans 
Bruyninckx (European Commission 2015a). 
For the period up to 2030, the European Council in October 2014 adopted the 2030 Framework 
for European climate and energy policies (European Commission, 2014b), a new structure based 
on the 2020 framework. This foresees a binding target for an internal EU reduction in GHG 
emissions of at least 40% by 203014 as compared with 1990 levels, a share of renewable energies 
(at the EU level) of at least 27% of energy consumption by 2030 and an indicative energy-efficiency 
target of at least 27% in energy savings by 2030. The Commission’s second “winter package” 
(European Commission 2016a) now proposes a 30% energy-savings target by 2030, instead of the 
original 27%, in order to step up its efforts to limit GHG emissions in line with the Paris Agreement. 
While the EEA recognizes the ambition of this objective, it also points out that it will already be 
challenging to achieve the new 2030 goals. In any case, even if these targets are achieved 
European countries will still have to double or even triple their emissions-cutting efforts after 2030 
in order to get onto a path that could limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius by mid-century. 
The	role	of	coal	and	gas	generation	
According to the IEA’s “Coal Information”, world coal production fell in 2015 by 221 million tonnes, 
which is the largest decline in absolute terms since the beginning of IEA records in 1971. Coal, by 
far the most CO2-intensive of all the primary-energy sources, continues to be primarily used for 
the generation of electricity and commercial heat, with 65.5% of primary coal being used for this 
                                                        
14 The GHG reduction target of 40% in 2030 originates from the Commission’s 2050 low carbon roadmap that 
aims at 80% GHG reduction in 2050. In the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report it was showed that in order to keep temperature rise between 2-2.4 degrees Celsius, 
industrialized countries will need to reduce emissions by 80-95% (IPCC 2007). 
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purpose globally in 2014, and 83.2% in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (IEA, 2016b). 
Within the EU, the production of derived heat from coal continued its long-term decreasing trend, 
diminishing by 56% since 1990. Nevertheless, a continued concentration of carbon-rich fuels in 
the EU’s energy mix can be still observed today. Indeed, some member states, such as 
Germany - among the largest coal producers along with Poland and the UK, but also one of the 
most pro-environmental countries - continue to rely heavily on coal. Overall, coal-fired power 
stations account for 17% of GHG emissions in the EU. Reducing reliance on coal and oil, and 
switching to natural gas for electricity and heat generation, needs to be a key element of its 
approach if the EU wants to meet its long-term climate policy objectives for 2050. 
However, while in 2010 gas and coal accounted for an equal share of electricity generation - 24% 
each - due to the relatively low coal price, conventional coal-fired power stations (of which three 
quarters belong to a generation of plant more than 30 years old) had at that time been running at 
full capacity. By 2014, gas had decreased to a 17% share, while coal increased to 27%. Even though 
a recovery in gas demand is projected, and a slight upturn has already been observed for 2015, it 
is unlikely that a fuel switch from coal to gas will happen without a strong carbon-pricing 
programme or policies targeting the phasing-out of coal (Genoese et al., 2016). 
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3.2 The	Turkish	mid-	and	long-term	strategies	
Similar to the EU, Turkey’s energy security is based on the principles of security of supply, 
competitiveness and sustainability. Turkey met 25% of its energy demand by domestic resources 
in 2014 (Turkish Petroleum, 2016: 25). Due to high import dependency, the primary aim in energy 
policy is to secure supplies. Within this context, diversification of energy resources, establishing a 
competitive market, exploiting indigenous resources, increasing share of renewables, ensuring 
sustainability, increasing energy efficiency are considered priorities. Furthermore, maintaining 
electricity interconnections with neighboring countries, including nuclear energy to Turkey’s 
energy mix, establishing an energy hub by using geopolitical location and reducing current deficit 
by decreasing energy imports are also mentioned (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of 
the Republic of Turkey, 2016b: 2017 yili bütçe sunumu, Ankara). 
Turkey aims to increase the share of coal from 26% to 37% while it foresees decreases in the shares 
of oil from 28% to 26% and natural gas from 31% to 23 % in 2023 (Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Republic of Turkey, 2016a: 13). This shows that coal is expected to be the 
dominant energy resource in the primary energy supply and replace natural gas in 2023. Although 
this target is in harmony with the aim to exploit domestic resources, it is in contradiction with the 
goal to ensure sustainability. 
The shares of hydro in primary energy supply is expected to reach 4% in 2023, and other 
renewables 6% (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Turkey, 2016a: 13). 
Bearing in mind that the shares of hydro and non-hydro renewables in 2015 were 4 % and 7%, it 
seems that even a decrease in the share of non-hydro renewables is foreseen whereas the share 
of hydro is expected to remain the same. This shows that ongoing investments on renewable 
energy are not sufficient to increase the share of renewables in total primary energy supply and 
consolidates the continuation of dominance of fossil fuels. 
The next sections not only examine the extents of which Turkey liberalizes its natural gas and 
electricity markets and pursues decarbonization policies, but also elaborates the situations in 
hydro, non-hydro renewables, nuclear energy and role of coal and gas in electricity generation. 
Energy-market	liberalization	processes	in	Turkey	
Natural Gas 
The liberalization of Turkish natural gas markets started in 2001. This was a precondition of Turkey 
obtaining International Monetary Fund (IMF) credits, which were needed to overcome the effects 
of the economic crisis then afflicting the country. The Natural Gas Law terminated the monopoly 
of state-owned provider BOTAŞ, and authorized the country’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA) to grant licences for market activities. Although a draft law amending the Natural Gas Law 
was sent to the country’s Grand National Assembly in August 2014, it has not been discussed as 
of the beginning of 2017. 
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The pace of liberalization in the Turkish natural gas market has been slow, as the current situation 
regarding unbundling, concentration in the market, market opening and pricing mechanisms 
show. Transmission and trade are not separated in Turkey despite the provisions in the Natural 
Gas Law, while BOTAŞ - as of the beginning of 2017 - still has to address unbundling requirements. 
The company operates the gas network and one LNG terminal, and has investments in gas-storage 
facilities and the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which aims to transport 16 bcm 
of Azeri gas to Turkey and Europe. BOTAŞ has a market share of 84% in natural gas supplies, and 
dominates wholesale trade and supplies to distribution companies (EMRA, 2016b: 9, 20). The 
Natural Gas Law foresees import restrictions on BOTAŞ and private companies, which hamper the 
establishment of a competitive market. Although market opening has been in place for all non-
household customers since 2013, the number of eligible consumers in 2015 stood at only around 
484,000 out of approximately 11,640,000 Turkish customers (EMRA, 2016b: 35) due to the large 
number of households among those consumers. 
Despite formal market opening, the pricing mechanism managed by BOTAŞ creates a barrier to 
establishing a competitive market. Although the wholesale gas price is determined by the seller 
and the buyer, BOTAŞ’ prices are considered a benchmark by other wholesale companies (Soysal 
et al., 2012: 116; PwC, 2014: 8, World Bank, 2015: 141). BOTAŞ maintains cross-subsidization, as 
it sells cheaper gas to distribution companies, eligible consumers and non-state power plants, and 
expensive gas to both state-owned power plants and to build-operate-transfer power plants 
(World Bank, 2015: 142).15 The provision for distribution companies to purchase at the lowest 
price thus forces them to buy from BOTAŞ, which supplies the cheapest gas. Through this practice, 
the state policy of supplying subsidized gas to households is successfully achieved. This pricing 
mechanism has a negative impact on BOTAŞ’ financial position, hampers LNG access and dissuades 
potential investors due to uncertainties and low profit prospects (Soysal et al., 2012: 126). Turkey 
does not have day-ahead or secondary gas markets; nor does it operate a full entry-exit system, 
which necessitates different prices at each entry and exit point. In addition, its balancing regime 
is insufficient, as the balancing gas price is determined ex ante. 
Infrastructural problems remain regarding the Electronic Bulletin Board, which is the tool for 
managing capacity allocation and balancing, and SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition).16 Such difficulties also occur with regard to physical capacity. Maximum capacity for 
the entry point is 196.5 million cubic metres per day (mcm/d), whereas in cold winters the demand 
can reach up to 230 mcm/d (IEA, 2016a: 11). Furthermore, east-west transportation capacity 
experiences shortages due to a lack of compressor stations. Moreover, the annual storage 
                                                        
15 Build-operate-transfer is a form of project financing, wherein a private entity receives a concession from the 
private or public sector to finance, design, construct, and operate a facility stated in the concession contract. 
16 SCADA helps to monitor the pipelines. “SCADA systems provide monitoring staff the ability to direct and control 
pipeline flows, maintaining pipeline integrity and pressures as natural gas is received and delivered along 
numerous points on the system, including flows into and out of storage facilities” (Itteilag, 2012:46). 
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capacity in 2015 was 2.661 bcm whereas consumption in the same year was 48 bcm (EMRA, 
2016b: 51). 
One of the main differences between the EU’s and Turkey’s legislation is that whereas the EU 
considers transit pipelines as equal to transmission, thus enabling third-party access, Turkey does 
not perceive transit as a market activity under the Natural Gas Law or the Draft Law. Rather, the 
country’s Transit Law aims to regulate the rules and procedures concerning the transit of oil and 
natural gas through pipelines. The Transit Law does not establish a transit regime, and thus does 
not enable third-party access. The transit issue is decided afresh in each intergovernmental 
agreement. The country’s Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Customs and Trade, the latter in 
case of emergency and necessity for the country’s interests, are the competent authorities to 
execute agreements related to transit-pipeline projects. The approach of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), which has been in power since 2002, shows that not only the state 
company but also private firms can be responsible for transit-pipeline projects as long as the 
government retains the power to decide on the company; no tender was published in the case of 
either Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline project or the Iran-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline project 
(Korkmaz-Temel, 2016: 199-200). 
Bearing all these factors in mind, we are far from being able to claim that Turkey has a liberal 
natural gas market. The Competition Authority argues that the Natural Gas Law, dated 2001, is 
not an efficient tool for establishing a competitive market since the law foresees regulations for 
“developed” or “mature” markets while the Turkish natural gas market is still at the stage of 
growth, due to increasing gas demand from power plants. Within this context, the Authority claims 
that the main problem in the liberalization process is the lack of a competition culture within the 
state company, BOTAŞ (Soysal et al., 2012: 24, 49, 140). 
Domestic discussions on the liberalization of the country’s natural gas market revolves around the 
question of to what extent Turkey needs to liberalize. Within this context, discussions are 
dominated by key issues such as the scope of the public service, the extent to which the state 
should be a player in the natural gas market, the necessity of having a vertically integrated body 
in the market and how to restructure the state company (Korkmaz-Temel, 2016: 179). 
Electricity 
Liberalization in electricity has progressed much further than in the case of natural gas, bearing in 
mind the levels of unbundling, market openness and wholesale-market provisions required. 
Competitive and regulated market activities are unbundled. The transmission operator is the 
Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEIAŞ), a state-owned company which owns and 
operates all transmission assets. In the generation segment, Turkey’s Electricity Generation 
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Company (EÜAŞ) operates along with private generators17 and auto-producers.18 EÜAŞ is 
controlled by the government and holds state-owned assets, mainly hydro and thermal power 
plants. Finally, in the distribution segment, the operations of the Turkish Electricity Distribution 
Company (TEDAŞ) have been divided between 21 regions: the privatization process is complete, 
with distribution companies now legally unbundled. The eligibility threshold has been decreasing 
since 2003. While this was 9,000 megawatt hours (MWh) per year in 2003, it was reduced to 3.6 
MWh per year in 2016. This means that all consumers with a consumption above this threshold 
have the right to choose their own supplier. Although the ultimate aim is to reduce the threshold 
to zero in order to increase customers’ mobility, the proportion of consumers changing their 
suppliers was below 5% in 2016 (European Commission, 2016g: 55). 
A formal electricity wholesale market has been in operation since 2015. Energy Exchange Istanbul 
(EPIAŞ) is the new operator of this concern, which includes a day-ahead market and an intraday 
market. Both TEIAŞ and the Istanbul Stock Exchange hold 30% of EPIAŞ, while the remaining 40% 
is shared among market participants. The expectation was that EPIAŞ would increase liquidity and 
the availability of derivative instruments, which would be traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
However, only approximately 30% of the electricity is traded in this market. The remaining trade 
occurs via bilateral legacy contracts, which are handled by the state company, Turkish Electricity 
Trading and Contracting Corporation (TETAŞ) (World Bank, 2015). TETAŞ purchases electricity 
generated by EÜAŞ and private wholesale companies with which the state has a purchasing-
guarantee contract. 
Despite the actual progress in the sector, further challenges remain. For instance, there is no cost-
based pricing mechanism in the electricity market, while cross-subsidies still exist between regions 
as there is a single national tariff. The March 2015 blackout,19 which lasted ten hours, exemplified 
the shortcomings of an electricity-transmission network in which imbalances between hydro 
power plants in the east and consumers in the west of the country need to be better managed. 
Transmission and distribution losses are among the infrastructural problems that have a negative 
impact on energy efficiency in Turkey. Furthermore, the high share of natural gas in electricity 
generation causes problems in cases of gas-supply interruptions and shortages, bearing in mind 
the country’s insufficient storage facilities. 
The liberalization of Turkey’s electricity market has been criticized by some stakeholders. 
Domestic discussions question to what extent the Energy Market Regulatory Authority’s licensing 
policy contributes to securing electricity supplies and whether the liberalization policy has allowed 
                                                        
17 Private generators are independent private producers and private companies with build-operate-transfer (BOT), build-
own-operate (BOO) and transfer of operating rights (TOOR) contracts. The second group occurred as a result of the 
privatization policy during 1980 s and 1990s. While the state continued to own the power plant in a TOOR contract, it was 
transferred to the state at the end of the contract in BOT contract. BOO contract refers to full privatization but with a power 
purchasing guarantee by the state (IEA, 2016a: 136-137). 
18 Auto-producers produce electiricty for their own needs. 
19 March 2015 blackout was a national power outage, except the city of Van, which supplies its gas from Iran. The blackout 
did not have any effect on neighbours. 
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the dominance of some private groups in the electricity market, as their market shares in 
distribution, production and wholesale segments have increased (TMMOB, 2016). 
Decarbonization	policies	and	the	path	after	the	Paris	Agreement	
Turkey has been a party to the UNFCCC since 2004, and to the Kyoto Protocol since 2009. In 2015, 
the country set its first GHG emission-reduction target for 2030. Accordingly, Turkey aims at a 21% 
reduction in GHG emissions from the “business as usual” scenario by 2030 (Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources of the Republic of Turkey, 2012b), and energy represents the largest share of 
any factor in total GHG emissions (72.5% in 2014) (IEA, 2016a: 11, 16). The GHG emission-
reduction policies in the context of Turkey’s energy policy would include increasing capacity in the 
production of electricity from solar power to 10 GWh and from wind power to 16 GWh until 2030. 
It would also mean utilizing the country’s full hydroelectric potential, commissioning at least one 
nuclear power plant, reducing electricity transmission losses to 15% of their current total, 
rehabilitating public electricity-generation power plants, and establishing on-site micro-
generation and co-generation systems and production capabilities. Bearing in mind that Turkish 
policies on climate change were previously based on denying the country’s climate responsibilities 
during the 1990s and 2000s and refusing to declare a target after the year 2009, the goal of a 21% 
reduction is a significant achievement. However, this target has been considered “inadequate” as 
it does not enable Turkey to make a fair contribution towards keeping global warming below 2 
degrees Celsius (Climate Transparency, 2015: 99). It is argued that the reduction target is based 
on an unrealistic “business-as-usual” scenario, into which Turkey has already factored a significant 
increase in its emissions. The target appears thus as a reduction from such a high increase, as 
considered in a mitigation scenario. Bearing in mind that emissions increased by 110% in the 23 
years between 1990 and 2013, Turkey’s target foresees an increase by 102%, compared to 2013 
levels, in 2030 (Şahin, 2015: 13). 
In this context, Turkey aims to reduce its energy intensity by at least 20% by 2023, a move that 
would contribute to its emission-reduction target. Turkey’s energy intensity increased by 7.1% 
during 2005-15, while the average result among IEA countries overall was a 16.3% reduction. 
Energy demand-side measures remain crucial for achieving energy efficiency - as do the 
rehabilitation of energy infrastructure to prevent distribution and transmission losses, and 
measures to prevent electricity theft (IEA, 2016a: 47). 
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The	integration	and	development	of	renewables	in	Turkey	
Turkey has the potential for a high level of solar, wind and geothermal energy resources. 
Investments in non-hydro renewables have accelerated, especially in recent years: the total share 
of non-hydro renewables in installed capacity was 0.09% in 2005 and 7.35% in 2015. Investments 
in renewables have mainly focused on wind and geothermal, while those in solar remain minimal. 
Although the share of renewables in the total installed capacity has been increasing and the 
percentage of renewable energy (including hydro) in the total primary-energy supply has ranged 
between 8.77% and 14.53%, this latter peak was registered in 1999 - since when, the contribution 
of renewables has declined due to an increasing consumption of fossil fuels and a decline in the 
share of biofuels and biogas (General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 
various years). Furthermore, Turkey is still far from realizing its potential in renewable energy, 
especially in the case of wind, despite the increasing share of renewables in its installed capacity. 
For example, the country’s installed capacity for wind meets less than 10% of its wind potential. 
In the case of geothermal energy, the figure is even lower: 2% (TMMOB, 2012: 160, 172; Usta, 
2015). 
Figure 2.4 shows the increase in the shares of geothermal, wind and solar in contrast to the 
decrease in biomass and biofuel. While the share of biofuels and biogas in 1999 was 9.18%, it 
decreased steadily to 2.45% in 2015. The share of geothermal in total primary-energy supply was 
around 1% until 2007. Afterwards, it increased progressively to 3.97% in 2015. Since 2010, the 
shares of wind and solar have been increasing, although they both remain at less than 1%. 	
Figure 3.4 - Share of renewable energy in total primary energy supply (%) 
 
Source: Data from the General Directorate of Energy Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Energy Balance Tables. 
Compiled, calculated and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
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The share of renewable energy in electricity production is shown in Figure 2.5. Although there has 
been an increase in the share of geothermal, solar and wind, fossil fuels still dominate electricity 
generation in Turkey. The share of geothermal, solar and wind in producing electricity in 2015 was 
5.8%, whereas coal amounted to 29.1% and natural gas to 37.9%. Together with hydro, the share 
of renewables was 30%, which the Turkish Government mentioned as a target for the year 2023 
(EMRA, 2016a: 5). 
Figure 3.5 - Share of energy resources in electricity production (%) 
 
Source: Data from TEIAŞ, 2017. Compiled, calculated and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
Despite the fact that Turkey aims to increase its solar-generating capacity to 10 GW and its wind 
capacity to 16 GW by 2030, many challenges prevent the country from fulfilling its potential. Key 
concerns of investors related to the development of renewable energy include problems regarding 
governance, such as long bureaucratic processes, rapid changes in legislation, a lack of clear 
standards and rules, a lack of accountability, the division of labour and cooperation among 
governmental organizations and a lack of long-term planning. Investors also mention risks related 
to their cash flow; inadequate demand; the number of competitors, which would reduce their 
profit; public acceptance; and connectivity to transmission and distribution networks (Özbuğday, 
2016: 7, 11; Erden-Topal, 2016: 72-82). Furthermore, the IEA (2016a: 179) considers “the high 
licence and connection fees for renewable projects, delays in grid connection and expansion, 
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regulatory uncertainty over the regime for distributed generation and the costs blocking the 
expansion of notably solar power” as relevant challenges to investments in renewable energy 
within the country. Finally, insufficient funding for research and development, low feed-in-tariffs 
compared with those in other countries and contradictions between targets of renewable energy 
and protection of the environment are mentioned as discouraging factors (WWF, 2011: 9-11). 
The	role	of	coal	and	gas	in	electricity	generation	
Turkey is largely dependent on fossil fuels in its electricity production. As Figure 2.5 shows, the 
share of natural gas in electricity production increased until 2007, when - for three years - natural 
gas accounted for almost half of the electricity produced. It then started to decrease slightly, 
although it experienced another increase in 2014. Bearing in mind that Turkey imports almost all 
of its natural gas, the country is highly dependent on imported natural gas in electricity 
production, which means that any problem in securing natural gas supplies would have a direct 
impact on its electricity sector. The share of coal in electricity production typically ranges between 
approximately 23% and 32%. Since 2005, this share has increased, reaching a level of 30% again 
in 2014 (TEIAŞ, 2017). Bearing in mind the share of imported coal in 2015 (64.27%) in the total 
coal supply, high import dependency in electricity production increases concerns about energy 
security. Moreover, Turkey is highly dependent on Russia both for imported coal and natural gas. 
While natural gas imports from Russia accounted for 55.31% of the total in 2015, coal imports 
from Russia amounted to 32.79% (Turkish Petroleum, 2016: 28).20 
Turkey’s	strategy	for	hydroelectricity	
The share of hydro in Turkey’s installed capacity was around 40% at the beginning of the 2000s 
and then decreased steadily until 2010, when the share amounted to 31.97%, and then started to 
increase slightly again (see Figure 2.6). This reduction in the share of hydro coincides with an 
increase in the installed capacity of thermal power plants, to meet growing domestic demand. The 
share of hydro in electricity production changes according to weather conditions, and thus ranges 
between 16% and 30%. Figure 2.5 shows that while natural gas dominates electricity production, 
the consumption of coal and hydro for electricity generation occur interchangeably: when the 
share of coal increases the share of hydro decreases, and vice versa. In 2015, the share of hydro 
in electricity production was 25.6%. Nevertheless, the government has the target of utilizing 
Turkey’s full hydroelectric potential by 2030. The main challenges to this goal are grid connection; 
the process of project selection; environmental concerns about run-of-river plants; the control of 
construction and the lack of development plans for river basins, which cause insufficient usage; 
operational problems; and disagreements among project holders (World Bank, 2015: 160-163). 
Furthermore, Turkey is expected to be affected negatively by climate change. Indeed, the country 
is likely to face challenges due to this phenomenon such as a decrease in rainfall and an increase 
                                                        
20 See also the International Clean Coal Summit website: Coal Market, http://cleancoalsummit.org/turkish-coal-
market. 
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in average temperature, which would limit its capacity to exploit hydro resources for generation 
(Turkish State Meteorological Service, 2015: 61-95, 130). 
Figure 3.6 - Share of energy resources in installed capacity (%) 
 
Source: Data from TEIAŞ, 2017. Compiled, calculated and graphed by Dicle Korkmaz Temel. 
Turkey’s	strategy	for	nuclear	power	
Turkey’s nuclear power strategy is closely linked to the pressing issue of energy-supply security, 
and nuclear energy is seen by the Turkish authorities as a critical aspect of the country’s 
diversification strategy. The “Strategic Plan 2015-2019” sets the target of diversifying electricity 
production via the integration of nuclear energy. The installation of nuclear power plants is 
planned to ensure the base-load electricity supply domestically (Turkish Ministry of Energy, 2015: 
40, 17). Moreover, given Turkey’s desire to mitigate its vulnerability vis-à-vis its reliance on 
imported gas for electricity (Erdurmaz, 2012: 238), nuclear energy is considered one of the most 
important alternatives in the diversification of the country’s energy mix (Kibaroğlu, 1997 ; Kılıç, 
2008; Uslu, 2010). 
While efforts towards the construction of nuclear power plants have intensified from the 2000s 
onwards, due to Turkey’s increasing energy need (Ülgen, 2012), the country’s engagement with 
civilian usages of nuclear power dates back to 1956 when the Atomic Energy Commission was 
established.21 Turkey’s attempts to construct its first nuclear power plant were finalized with an 
agreement concerning the cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian 
                                                        
21 Currently, Turkey’s nuclear developments are under the authority of Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). 
See the TAEK website: History, http://www.taek.gov.tr/en/institutional/history.html. 
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Federation upon facilitating and operation of a nuclear power plant.22 Within this context, in July 
2010, the Turkish Parliament approved the intergovernmental agreement between Russia and 
Turkey for the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, a town in Mersin 
province along the shores of the Mediterranean. According to this agreement, the Russian state-
owned atomic power company ROSATOM will construct and operate the Akkuyu nuclear power 
plant (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016: 86). In late 2015, increasing tensions in bilateral relations and the 
impact of this resulted in delays in the implementation of the project, and have led to the 
questioning of Akkuyu’s future. Although this tension highlighted the vulnerability of the Akkuyu 
power plant project to Russia’s technical, economic and political variables, now that the political 
climate between Ankara and Moscow has improved (BBC, 2016) both sides have taken steps to 
ensure that the nuclear deal is a commercial project based on an international agreement, and 
not to be affected by any possible future tension. The Turkish Minister of Energy, Berat Albayrak, 
has anticipated that the first reactor will start generating electricity in 2023, coinciding with the 
100th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Sputnik, 2017). The Akkuyu deal has 
a dual impact on Turkish-Russian relations. On the one hand, it will enhance mutual economic ties 
with approximately $20 billion of Russian investment in Turkey and enable some limited 
technology transfer. On the other hand, it will render Turkey even more dependent on Moscow 
in meeting its rising energy demand (Yilmaz and Sever, 2016). 
At a time when a number of countries have been revisiting their nuclear energy plans in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the Turkish Government is persistent about carrying out its 
nuclear energy agenda. On 2013, it announced its decision to construct a second power plant in 
Sinop with a consortium led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Areva, with Itochu (World 
Nuclear Association, 2017). Most recently, in August 2016, the agreement previously concluded 
on 9 April 2012 between China and Turkey on the “Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy” (Turkish Government, 2012a) was ratified, leading to discussions regarding a third nuclear 
power plant in the country. Speculations over İğneada as the third nuclear power plant site ignited 
reactions by environmentalists and strict opposition from the region’s residents (Çelikkan, 2015). 
So far, the Ministry has refrained from officially naming İğneada and has highlighted the fact that 
the final decision would be based on the strategic evaluation of several criteria (Bloomberg, 2016). 
While discussions on İğneada continue, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources affirmed 
that by 2030, 10% of Turkey’s installed power capacity will be produced by three nuclear power 
plants (Daily Sabah, 2016). 
The Turkish Government justifies its push for nuclear power on the grounds of enhanced energy 
security, lower cost, reductions in carbon emissions, and the benefits of potential nuclear-
technology training and transfer. However, there are also some critical areas regarding nuclear 
                                                        
22 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of Russian Federation 
on Cooperation in Relation to the Construction and Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant at the Akkuyu Site in 
the Republic of Turkey, signed in Ankara on 12 May 2012. 
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energy that might lead to challenging problems in the future (Global Relations Forum, 2014). Some 
of the key challenges are seismic risks, radioactive waste and storage problems, the possibility of 
radiation leakages, environmental risks to marine life, the security challenge of protecting the 
nuclear power plant and its highly strategic materials against terrorist attacks, and the risk of 
accidents and a potential proliferation crisis.23 Hence, it is essential to have an effective oversight 
mechanism in place, with the necessary technological and scientific expertise to aptly monitor 
every stage of the process (Ülgen, 2012). 
As a newcomer to the nuclear energy field, developing its technical and administrative capacity, 
investing in its human capital, addressing the potential security threats and strengthening its 
security culture are important tasks for Turkey. The build-own-operate model agreed with Russia 
for Akkuyu is unique, and requires prudent arrangements for security and waste management 
(Ülgen, 2016). Moreover, Turkey still needs to align its legislative and administrative capacity with 
international and EU standards. In the context of the latter, progress reports indeed highlight the 
necessity of further requirements concerning legislation on reporting, monitoring, and judicial and 
administrative capacity. Nuclear safety, the necessity of an independent authority,24 security and 
the level of public consultations (European Commission, 2015d: 48) emerge as potential areas for 
further progress.25 
While nuclear energy emerges as a critical aspect of Turkey’s plans for enhancing its energy 
security, it should also develop within a framework that proceeds cautiously concerning issues 
related to human and environmental security. In this respect, there is a significant need for policy 
alignment, as well as potential opportunities for collaboration with the EU. 
  
                                                        
23 For a comprehensive assessment of the strategic effects of nuclear energy development, see Stulberg & 
Fuhrmann (2013). 
24 Available in the Progress Reports for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2014, 2016. See European Commission 
(1998-2016). 
25 For an extended analysis and comparison of the EU and Turkey’s nuclear energy policies with reference to 
Turkey’s alignment process with the EU, see Sever (2017). 
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4. The	 framework	of	energy	cooperation	between	Turkey	and	 the	
EU	
Energy represents a strategic issue in relations between Brussels and Ankara. For more than a 
decade, Turkey and the EU have regarded energy not only as a matter of mutual interest but also 
as a key tool with which to strengthen their bilateral political dialogue. The two have therefore 
been building or participating in platforms supporting convergence in the sector, some of which 
have already reached positive outcomes. 
Cooperation has mainly focused on energy security, and specifically the diversification of gas 
supplies, as a result of the need of both parties to access new, secure sources of gas and to open 
transit routes. In this context, since 2003 Turkey has been at the centre of the most ambitious 
external-energy policy initiative ever established by the EU, the realization of the Southern Gas 
Corridor. In parallel with this initiative, the authorities in Ankara have placed “contribution to 
Europe’s energy security” among the four key priorities of their country’s own national energy 
strategy (Koranyi & Sartori, 2013: 3), repeatedly stressing the link between Turkey’s indispensable 
role for European energy security and the EU accession process. From the Turkish point of view, 
the country’s “membership perspective and the […] accession negotiations with the EU will be a 
driving force for the realization of joint projects which will enhance the supply security of Turkey 
and the EU” (Korany & Sartori, 2013: 4). 
Given the high political value attached by Ankara to energy cooperation with the EU, the freezing 
of negotiations and the uncertain status of the accession process could negatively impact on the 
evolution of the bilateral energy dialogue, at least in strategic and very sensitive domains such as 
that of natural gas. 
While this could lead to a divergent path in the most relevant sector, EU-Turkey energy 
cooperation, both at the bilateral and at the multilateral level, covers a wide range of increasingly 
complex issues that go beyond security concerns in the gas sector and would lead, if pursued 
wholeheartedly, to overall convergence. These issues include the integration of energy markets 
together with their adaptation to ambitious decarbonization and sustainable-development 
objectives being undertaken at European and global levels. 
4.1 EU-Turkey:	the	status	of	bilateral	energy	cooperation	
As mentioned above, bilateral energy cooperation is closely interlinked with Turkey’s EU accession 
process. Energy is indeed among 35 policy areas of the acquis communautaire, the so-called 
“chapters”, covered by the negotiation process that has been in place between the EU and Turkey 
since October 2005. The Energy chapter covers EU legislation related to the functioning of the 
internal electricity and natural gas markets, the implementation of energy-efficiency measures, 
the integration of renewable-energy resources in the energy mix, the strengthening of the security 
of energy-supply policies and the improvement of nuclear safety. 
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Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European Union has been a driving factor in the 
country’s ongoing energy-sector restructuring. Despite a diminished ambition towards gaining EU 
accession by the government of President Erdoğan, the country’s interest in liberalization has also 
been promoted by the desire to attract investors. 
In terms of moving forward in the accession process, Ankara has made some headway in aligning 
its energy legislation and policy with the European acquis. Since 2001, Turkey has been taking 
important steps by enacting numerous regulations in order to ensure its compliance with EU rules 
and to establish a liberal and competitive market structure with an investor-friendly environment. 
However, despite evident mutual interests, the positive results achieved in certain sectors and the 
periodic calls from both Brussels’ and Ankara’s authorities for the opening of the Energy chapter, 
negotiations are still blocked. Furthermore, the Screening Report26 adopted in 2007 remains 
vetoed by Cyprus in the Council of the EU. More generally, in recent years the whole accession 
negotiation process has experienced significant delays due to a stagnation in political relations 
between the EU and Turkey, culminating in the freezing of negotiations in 2016, to the extent that 
one cannot be optimistic about future prospects for formal EU-Turkey energy dialogue in such an 
institutional framework. 
Of course, failing to open the Energy chapter weakens a proactive and cooperative stand on this 
issue by Ankara. The political and institutional stalemate places limits on the scope and timing of 
EU-Turkey energy-policy coordination as well as market integration - particularly in the sensitive 
gas sector, where convergence lags behind due to missing cross-border infrastructure and the lack 
of a stable, transparent, common legal and regulatory framework in Turkey. In order to bypass the 
political bottlenecks slowing down the transfer and implementation of EU energy legislation in 
Turkey, Brussels and Ankara have tried to adopt alternative institutional initiatives in order to 
promote energy cooperation outside the accession negotiations. Apart from failed attempts by 
Brussels to persuade the Turkish Government to join the Energy Community (see Section 3.3), the 
most relevant bilateral energy-cooperation initiatives include the “Positive EU-Turkey Agenda” 
and the “Turkey-EU High Level Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation”. 
Launched in May 2012, the “Positive EU-Turkey Agenda” aimed to complement and enhance 
accession talks by fostering cooperation and practical activities in a number of sectors of joint 
interest as well as advancing economic integration. Energy was an integral part of this process, as 
confirmed by EU commissioners Günther Oettinger and Štefan Füle together with Turkish 
Ministers Egemen Bağış and Taner Yıldız in their June 2012 joint statement on “Enhanced EU-
                                                        
26 The Screening Report results from the screening analysis, through which EU legislation in the relevant 
chapters and Turkish legislation are compared, with the report identifying those areas where compliance is 
high and those where further policy and legal harmonization is expected. The Screening Report forms the very 
basis of the Commission’s Draft Common Position for the chapters to be negotiated. 
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Turkey energy cooperation”.27 The initiative - not officially intended to replace Turkey’s accession 
process, but rather an attempt at supporting the country towards integration into the EU energy 
system - expected to deepen EU-Turkey energy relations in six broad areas of mutual concern: 
long-term perspectives on energy scenarios and energy mix, market integration and the 
development of infrastructures of common interest, global and regional energy cooperation, the 
promotion of renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean-energy technologies, and nuclear 
safety and radiation protection. In practice, the “Positive Agenda”’ introduced regular exchanges 
and technical meetings between EU and Turkish officials, on these specific subjects, at working-
group level. 
Despite official statements clarifying the nature of the initiative (as a non-alternative to the 
accession negotiations), the launch of the Positive Agenda was perceived by many in Turkey as a 
further European attempt to dissociate energy cooperation from the stalled issue of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU, as previous attempts to accelerate EU-Turkish cooperation on energy had 
proved. 
In this context of growing political and strategic uncertainty, the launch of the “Turkey-EU High 
Level Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation” represents efforts by the newly installed 
Juncker Commission to revive institutional cooperation in the energy domain. Agreed in March 
2015 by EU Vice President Maroš Šefčovič and the former Turkish Minister for energy and natural 
resources, Taner Yıldız, the Dialogue sets out to complement and support Turkey’s accession 
process rather than substitute for or bypass it. Turkey is among the five strategic partners with 
whom the Commission has established such a cooperation framework (the others are Algeria, 
Canada, Norway and the US). The initiative aims to increase bilateral exchanges at ministerial 
level, and it is accompanied by preparation activities carried out through regular meetings at the 
council, committee and subcommittee levels. So far two “High-Level Dialogue” meetings have 
been held between the end of 2015 (in the context of the Paris Climate Conference, or “COP21”) 
and 2016, while a third one is scheduled for the beginning of March 2017. Particularly relevant are 
the results of the 2016 meeting, for which the Turkish Minister for energy and natural resources, 
Berat Albayrak, and the EU Commissioner for climate action and energy, Miguel Arias Cañete, 
convened in Istanbul: on that occasion, the Commissioner stressed the EU’s commitment to 
evaluating the alignment of Turkish energy legislation, specifically through the resumption of the 
revision process for the Screening Report on the Energy chapter (European Commission, 2015). 
 
 
                                                        
27 Other areas of cooperation addressed by the Positive Agenda include: political reforms, alignment with the 
acquis, dialogue on foreign policy, visas, mobility and migration, trade, counter-terrorism and participation in 
EU programs. See European Commission (2012a; 2012b). 
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4.2 The	integration	of	European	and	Turkish	energy	markets	
The different levels of integration between the electricity and the gas markets, as well as the status 
of the interconnections, reflect the overall discrepancies in the two main sectors of EU-Turkey 
energy cooperation. 
Indeed, electricity has witnessed a significant improvement while gas has been lagging behind. 
While Turkey also has working interconnections with Iran, Iraq, Georgia, Syria and Armenia, only 
its European connections are synchronous - the others being used only to supply isolated areas 
(despite an export-import potential similar to that which it has with Europe) (Karbuz, 2014). 
Following an application made in 2000 by Turkish grid operator TEIAŞ to ENTSO-E’s predecessor, 
the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE), and a trial period from 
September 2010 to April 2014 (ENTSO-E, 2010), a long-term agreement on permanent 
synchronous operation between the Turkish power system and Continental Europe was signed in 
April 2015 (ENTSO-E, 2015a). Thus, Turkey has become able to use interconnections with Bulgaria 
and Greece on a regular basis, and to export a maximum of 400 MW of electricity and import up 
to 500 MW. Cooperation with Europe was also strengthened by the accession of TEIAŞ to ENTSO-
E as the first observer member allowed into the organization in January 2016 (ENTSO-E, 2016). 
Overall, the observership and the synchronization highlight Turkey’s compliance with the 
transmission-related components of the acquis communautaire - in particular, third-party access 
rules and the liberalization of the energy market. 
Turkey is, in fact, already well advanced in the latter case. Its privatization of power generation 
and distribution in the past ten years has greatly expanded private investments in the country’s 
electricity sector, doubling capacity from 2007 to 2014 (IEA, 2016a). The process was further 
enhanced by the 2013 Electricity Market Law, which contributed to reaching an almost 86% 
opening of the electricity market by the end of 2015 (IEA, 2016a). The law is also mostly compliant 
with the EU Third Energy Package,28 thus strengthening the potential for EU-Turkey cooperation. 
Despite this, the direct effect of this last stage of liberalization has been to reduce energy exchange 
with Europe - most likely due to increased generation capacity, which resulted in electricity 
imports in the first half of 2016 being down 46% compared with the same period of 2015 (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2017a). 
Further electricity interconnections with Turkey are therefore possible, but actually far from 
certain. One major project - an undersea cable with Romania - will probably be dropped, following 
Romanian state secretary Corina Popescu’s declarations of last August. On that occasion, she 
pointed out the instability in the area and Turkey’s alleged focus on alternating-current 
connections (the cable will be direct-current instead) (Bendre, 2016). Moreover, no other similar 
projects are being discussed or developed - either at member-state or at Commission level. Yet, 
                                                        
28 The Third Energy Package is the latest round of EU energy market legislation, enacted to improve the 
functioning of the internal energy market and resolve structural problems. 
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extending the European grid to neighbouring countries is often part of the Commission’s and the 
Energy Union’s discourse. For instance, the newly EU-funded electricity lines in Bulgaria fell under 
the “Black Sea Corridor” framework, a series of electric interconnections that also envisages the 
involvement of Turkey (European Commission, 2016d). 
Beyond the European level, further integration in the sector is guaranteed by the Coordination 
Auction Office in South East Europe (SEE CAO), which Turkey contributed to founding in 2012. This 
organization allocates available transmission capacities among its ten participating countries, 
which include two EU member states (Greece and Croatia), and works in compliance with 
Regulation (EC) 714/2009. 
The situation for gas is significantly different, offering a more positive picture regarding the 
development of infrastructures but underdeveloped integration in terms of market structure and 
the regulatory framework. 
Connections between the EU and Turkey are through Bulgaria, with a capacity of 478 GWh per 
day, and via the Turkey-Greece interconnector (ITG), with a capacity of 49 GWh per day (GIE). The 
expansion of those facilities is likely, particularly considering the latest developments over the 
TANAP pipeline. After the approval of two $400 million loans from the World Bank, one to 
Azerbaijan and one to Turkey, and $600 million from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to 
Azerbaijan’s Southern Gas Corridor Company (Mustafayeva, 2016), it is reasonable to expect that 
the infrastructure will be completed by the expected date (2018). The TANAP will provide 6 bcm 
of gas to Turkey and 10 to Europe, when the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is completed, likely in 
2020, thus boosting the still limited integration of the European and Turkish gas markets. 
In fact, even if the Natural Gas Market Law of 2001 and other pieces of Turkish legislation are 
already aligned on Third Package rules - in particular, those requesting the unbundling of all gas-
market activities - implementation has been largely inadequate. The state company BOTAŞ owns 
a majority share in Turkish imports, distribution and the sale of gas in the country; despite holding 
12 out of the 307 available licences for import, export, wholesale and other activities, the company 
controls 84% of all the gas imported to Turkey, including one of the two LNG facilities in the 
country. The Natural Gas Market Law has only received a small update, in summer 2016 (Yegin, 
2016), while a new version has not been discussed in parliament since 2014. 
The stalling in the liberalization of the Turkish gas market has thus limited integration with the 
European market, but it could be unblocked by further cooperation with the European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G). In the last meeting between the Network, 
BOTAŞ and the Energy Community Secretariat in May 2015, the two European institutions offered 
support in the implementation of the new law and of gas-network codes, and opened up the 
possibility of BOTAŞ joining ENTSO-G as an observer member (Energy Community, 2015). Yet, no 
further action followed the meeting. 
Nevertheless, integration between the European and the Turkish transmission systems is a feature 
of the priority sectors for which the €4,453.9 million of pre-accession assistance provided to 
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Turkey are destined. This budget is valid for the period 2014-20 and also covers the adjustment of 
Turkish gas and electricity network codes against their European counterparts; however, while 
TEIAŞ is expected to apply European codes soon, progress in the gas sector has been limited. As 
the Commission wrote in its Energy Action Document in 2015: 
The institutional capacity of BOTAŞ has to be improved in terms of reliability, efficiency 
and operational performance of the natural gas infrastructure as well as smooth 
operation of network in line with EU network codes (European Commission, 2015e: 5) 
In addition to this, Commission Energy Action Document identified a series of other issues 
undermining the integration of the European and Turkish gas systems (European Commission, 
2015e: 5). Specifically: 
• inefficiencies regarding “demand forecasting, system optimization, network and geographical 
simulation, which will ensure the effective operation of a liberalized gas market in line with 
EU acquis”. 
• Inadequate availability of data, which are however required to “enhance reliability and 
transparency of gas trade with third parties, including the market participants from EU.” 
• Deficiencies in “short-term and long-term decision making processes which pose a threat for 
an effective functioning of gas market”. 
4.3 The	role	of	multilateral	cooperation	platforms	
Along with enduring bilateral cooperation initiatives, the energy dialogue between the EU and 
Turkey takes place in several different multilateral fora. 
As mentioned above, the Energy Community is the most relevant institutional setting through 
which the EU engages with its neighbours, who - as contracting parties - commit themselves to 
implementing the relevant EU acquis on energy, environment and competition. Turkey has 
repeatedly refused to join the Energy Community or to unilaterally align with EU energy 
legislation, clearly preferring to link this process to deeper political dialogue with Brussels aimed 
at reaching full EU-membership status. In this context, the Turkish Government has made it clear 
that such an option is adequate for countries not eligible for EU membership but not for an 
accession candidate such as Turkey.29 From a more practical perspective, Ankara’s position is 
driven by the fact that, in the framework of the negotiations, Turkey has the right to decide on the 
timing of its alignment with some specific legislation (i.e. transit), whereas it does not have such a 
right in the Energy Community. 
Despite the intransigency of Ankara’s position vis-à-vis full membership, Turkey has been active in 
the Energy Community since its creation. Today, thanks to its observer status, officials from 
                                                        
29 As underlined by Ali Babacan and Hilmi Güler during the conference “Turkey and the EU: Together for a 
European Energy Policy” (held in Istanbul on 5 June 2007), candidate countries expect to align with the EU energy 
acquis through accession negotiations progressively and not in the framework of parallel cooperation processes 
such as participation in the Energy Community. 
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Ankara’s Energy Ministry and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) take part in its 
institutional activities, regularly attending meetings of the Ministerial Council; of the Regulatory 
Board; and of the Permanent High-Level Group (PHLG) as well as of the various fora, task forces 
and groups established by the Energy Community. Although its representatives cannot propose 
actions and do not have voting rights, regular exchanges within the Community allow Turkey’s 
officials to gain experience, interact with their European peers and bring back to Ankara lessons 
learned and expertise to be applied into their national institutional settings. 
As already mentioned, ENTSO-E also represents an important framework for Turkey to integrate 
into the European energy market. As stated by the organization, 
The observer member status will give TEIAS the possibility to attend groups and task 
forces within the association. This will facilitate cooperation between ENTSO-E and TEIAS 
whenever this adds value for the operators and the customers they serve (ENTSO-E, 
2016). 
The observership will facilitate Turkey’s ingress into the European market, easing the electricity 
trade between the two polities. Furthermore, it will support ENTSO-E in evaluating the standards 
applied by TEIAŞ in its service towards the European grid. 
In detail, cooperation with Turkey under the ENTSO-E umbrella operates through the participation 
of the Turkish transmission system operator (TSO), TEIAŞ, on some of the bodies of the 
organization; the status of observer grants accession only to a part of these and not to the 
Assembly, the highest body of the organization. TEIAŞ representatives can participate, then, in the 
Regional Group Continental South East, an entity operating under the wider System Operations 
Committee of ENTSO-E, which is responsible for technical and operational standards and the 
development of operational network codes. TEIAŞ has been also invited to send representatives 
to meetings of some of the groups under the Market Committee and the Research, Development 
and Innovation Committee of the organization. In addition to this, after synchronization Turkey 
has become part of the ENTSO-E Regional Group Continental Europe (RG CE), which comprises all 
TSOs of the synchronous European area and whose purpose is “to pursue the reliable and efficient 
operation of the Continental Europe Synchronous Area. The RG CE provides a framework for the 
regional activities of the member TSOs in the Continental Europe Synchronous Area within ENTSO-
E” (ENTSO-E, 2015b). 
The presence of Turkey in the above structure allows greater transparency and promotes 
cooperation; indeed, as part of the RG CE, Turkey has to notify to the Group about the 
development of further interconnections. This already happened in the case of the undersea cable 
between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, agreed in October 2016 during the 
World Energy Congress (Sengul, 2016). It is also interesting to remark that the EU’s interest in 
cooperation in the electricity sector with Turkey does not lie just in electricity exchanges but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, in the facilitating of European technology exports. The collateral 
effect of the use of EU network codes in third countries is indeed to increase exports of EU-
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developed software, IT technology and standards associated with these codes. Turkey could thus 
represent a “proxy country” for this process, looking towards its possible extension to Middle 
Eastern and African countries. 
Interaction with ENTSO-G, on the other hand, is very limited. Before the creation of the 
organization, BOTAŞ was among the founding members of, and an active participant within, the 
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) association. However, with the establishment of ENTSO-G, the 
Turkish company distanced itself from the group of European gas companies. In May 2015, ENTSO-
G and BOTAŞ resumed a certain degree of dialogue, anticipating the potential engagement of the 
Turkish company as an observer, but since then the only the only exchanges in place between the 
parties have been those related to the data provided by Ankara to ENTSO-G’s “Ten Year Network 
Development Plan” (TYNDP), in which the TANAP project is included (ENTSO-G, 2015). 
Technical cooperation takes also place in the context of MedReg and Med-TSO - respectively, the 
associations of the Mediterranean regulatory agencies and of the Mediterranean transmission 
system operators. Both organizations are supported by the EU and aim to foster energy 
cooperation in the Mediterranean region, promoting a transparent, stable and harmonized 
regulatory framework as well as an integrated, secure and sustainable energy market across the 
region. 
Turkey is among the founding members of MedReg, and EMRA’s representative holds the vice-
presidency of the association. Although MedReg was not established to promote the adoption of 
the acquis communautaire by Mediterranean non-EU countries, it represents an important forum 
for fostering regulatory coordination and encouraging energy convergence between the EU and 
its Mediterranean neighbours. Turkey regularly holds institutional positions within the 
organization: today, EMRA chairs MedReg’s Working Group on Gas and acts as vice-chair of the 
Institutional Working Group. In addition to this, a representative from the Turkish regulatory 
agency presides over the task force on the Union for the Mediterranean’s (UfM) energy platforms. 
This appointment is particularly relevant, as the three energy platforms - promoted by the 
European Commission in 2014 and launched within the framework of the UfM - represent the 
most important institutional, multilateral tool for reinforcing energy cooperation in the 
Mediterranean region.30 
Turkey is also extremely active within Med-TSO, of which it is one of the founding members, 
holding its vice-presidency since its establishment in 2012. This association has as its main 
objective the fostering of interoperability of the national/regional electricity markets across the 
Mediterranean, by establishing shared technical frameworks, defining common network planning 
and management procedures, and promoting the development of interconnections and joint 
projects. Turkey, through an official from TEIAŞ, chairs Med-TSO’s Regional Working Group East, 
                                                        
30 These are the Regional Electricity Market Platform (REM Platform), the Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Platform (REEE Platform), and the Gas Platform. 
 
Online Paper No. 2 “Energy and Climate Strategies, Interests and Priorities 
of the EU and Turkey” 
 
 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement No 692976. 
 
and represents the pivotal enabler of any initiative of the association in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region, whose countries are generally less active compared with its North African members. 
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5. Conclusions	
At first sight, interests and priorities - mainly determined by the common “energy and climate 
triangle” mantra - seem to be leading the EU and Turkey towards a converging path. Indeed, 
security, affordability and sustainability are still - in one way or another - the key factors shaping 
the energy and climate policies of Brussels and Ankara. 
However, despite manifest similarities between the parties (i.e. their extreme dependence on 
external resources) in their hypothetical strategic convergence, this paper shows that the parties 
are still quite different in terms of energy and climate profiles, and far from fully aligned when it 
comes to key interests and policy priorities. 
In the EU, energy consumption is basically flat, due to a combination of economic stagnation and 
improving energy-efficiency practices, and it is not expected to dramatically recover. In Turkey, on 
the contrary, energy-demand growth is expected to continue, although not at the same pace as 
in the past decade. This situation puts the EU and Turkey in different positions: while Brussels, still 
the global leader in the fight against climate change, can work more intensively on qualitative 
aspects (i.e. the progressive decarbonization of its energy sector), Ankara continues to struggle to 
provide adequate and secure supplies in order to enhance its socio-economic development. This 
is reflected, on the one hand, by the different levels of ambition of their respective 
decarbonization policies and rates of penetration of the renewables in their energy mix, and on 
the other, by their diverse levels of reliance on cheap and abundant (but polluting) energy sources 
such as coal. 
 
Decarbonization 
- Climate change/sustainability driver more for the EU than for Turkey, which does not seem 
to be able to reduce its hydrocarbon imports from abroad. 
- Decarbonization does not seem an actual priority for Turkey, thereby limiting the extent 
of its cooperation with the EU in this domain. 
 
Security of energy supplies and diversification of sources certainly constitute a domain in which 
the interests of the EU and Turkey appear more aligned, as Brussels and Ankara are among the 
world’s largest (in percentage terms) importers of energy, and for different reasons (declining 
domestic production in the EU, growing demand in Turkey) are both expected to increase their 
reliance on foreign supplies. A certain degree of convergence of interests is in place in the gas 
sector, in which the shared objective to access new gas resources in landlocked areas such as the 
Caspian Basin has encouraged ambitious joint initiatives, such as the Southern Gas Corridor. 
However, over the past few years, Ankara’s aspiration to play a strategic role for Europe’s energy 
security and diversification strategy has been mitigated by the impasse in the access negotiations 
and, more generally, in the political dialogue. The EU’s attempts to increase energy-security 
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cooperation with Turkey regardless of the latter’s inaction over the opening of chapter 15 (the 
proposal for Ankara to join the Energy Community) appear rather unsuccessful. As a result, Turkey 
has developed its own agenda on the Southern Gas Corridor (partnership with Azerbaijan on 
TANAP) and on relations with Russia, not necessarily fully in line with EU priorities. 
 
Security of supply 
- Gas remains important in the EU’s energy mix (as a key transition fuel), reinforcing 
Brussels’ need to cooperate with Turkey in this domain. However, uncertain progress over 
the Southern Gas Corridor (i.e. the availability of Azerbaijani gas, the destiny of TAP) may 
reduce the centrality of Turkey in this scheme. 
- Turkey needs to increase its imports of gas to meet growing demand, but not as much as 
previously expected due to economic slowdown. In this context, competition with the EU 
over additional supplies is not likely, and this outcome could generate a more cooperative 
approach from Ankara towards Brussels. 
 
Without a clear political incentive (i.e. EU accession), Turkey seems oriented towards intensifying 
cooperation where its energy priorities and interests are clearly safeguarded. This is, for instance, 
the case for electricity, where integration between European and Turkish markets is proceeding 
smoothly, and the liberalization of the market - through the implementation of legislative 
measures promoted by the EU - offers significant benefits to Turkish citizens and companies. In 
this domain, cooperation is successfully projected both at the bilateral and (in the Mediterranean 
region) at the multilateral level, demonstrating that if shared interests are in place the energy 
strategies and policies of Turkey and the EU can still converge. 
 
Market integration 
- Affordability of energy resources and better services to citizens and industry incentivize 
deeper cooperation between Turkey and the EU - as can be seen in the case of the electricity 
market. However, internal dynamics on both sides (i.e. the role of former energy 
monopolists or strong political incumbents) and strategic considerations (particularly in the 
gas sector) still limit full alignment. 
- In terms of initiatives and cooperation mechanisms, without clear political commitment it 
is difficult to imagine the EU and Turkey successfully converging on broad and ambitious 
cooperation schemes. However, ad hoc collaborations, and a positive role for Turkey in 
multilateral fora, offer the possibility of deepening the relationship - particularly to both 
parties’ mutual benefit for a more robust integration process. 
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